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I must admit that it is with some hesitance that I present my comments on Patrick 
Clauss’s paper. It seems to be a hazardous undertaking to comment upon a paper of an 
author who writes in his conclusion:  
 
With almost every sentence of this paper, I have asked myself, in one way or 
another, “What will my intended audience members likely think of this? What 
objections, questions, or assumptions might I be overlooking?” Anticipating 
all objections is not possible, of course. The key is anticipating the most 
important ones […]. 
 
This does not make my task as a commentator any easier. The risk is now of either 
giving the impression that the author has not achieved his aim of anticipating the 
objections of his intended audience or, alternatively, of giving the impression that my 
own objections are not the most important ones. I am sure that the latter will be the 
case, but I will give you my comments nonetheless. They are, for the major part, 
suggestions for a more refined analysis of the techniques employed in the realization 
of prolepsis. 
 
2. COMMENTS ON THE DEFINITIONS AND ANALYSES OF PROLEPSIS  
 
A first comment concerns the definitions and characterizations of prolepsis provided 
throughout the paper. The problem is that it is not always clear to me what Clauss’s 
criterion is for deciding what the most important features are of prolepsis. For 
instance, when discussing the Toulminian rebuttal, Clauss wonders whether “it [is] 
primarily the anticipation of the counterargument, and not also the direct answering 
thereof, that makes a prolepsis. He subsequently concludes that “the anticipation is 
what matters most”. Similarly, Clauss considers it characteristic of prolepsis that it is 
the anticipation of an argument before it has been made. Prolepsis is therefore 
according to him not the same as responding to counterarguments that an opponent 
has put forward at some earlier stage: the anticipated counterarguments should be 
imaginary. What is not exactly clear to me is what Clauss aims for in providing these 
specifications of what the most important traits of prolepsis are. Is this done in an 
attempt to stay as close as possible to the traditional definitions of the term prolepsis? 
And if that is not the case, is it then an attempt to give an analysis of prolepsis that 
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makes it possible to give an explanation of the rhetorical effectiveness or 
persuasiveness of this figure? From a dialectical viewpoint, for instance, the 
difference between anticipating imaginary objections that an opponent might come up 
with and responding to criticisms that have been put forward earlier does not seem so 
relevant: in both cases the arguer will have to deal with these criticisms in order to 
fulfill the burden of proof for his claim. And if Clauss intends to emphasize those 
features of prolepsis that are crucial to the persuasiveness of this figure of thought, 
one would expect some reference to social psychological research in which the 
persuasiveness of anticipating imaginary counterarguments as opposed to responding 
to counterarguments that have been advanced earlier is investigated and in which the 
effectiveness of just acknowledging a counterargument as compared to refuting the 
anticipated counterargument as well is measured. 
 
A second comment concerns the distinction that Patrick Clauss makes between two 
types of  prolepsis: a type “where an arguer explicitly recognizes weaknesses to his 
own position” and a type of prolepsis “where the arguer recognizes strengths to the 
‘other side’ ”.  First of all, I do not find this distinction very clear, since if an arguer 
admits that his own position has some weaknesses, this also means that he thereby 
concedes that the other party might rightfully criticize his position and thus recognizes 
strengths to the other side. After having taken a closer look at the examples Clauss 
gives of the two types of cases, I think that these cases can better be distinguished 
from each other by using a different criterion. The main difference between the cases 
concerned seems to be that in the case which Clauss analyses as recognizing strengths 
to the other side, a counter position or counter standpoint is mentioned, and 
subsequently refuted, whereas in the case that Clauss calls recognizing weaknesses in 
one’s own position, a counterargument is mentioned and conceded. It is then 
subsequently shown that the counterargument, though true, has no force as a 
counterargument since it is not relevant or too weak to support the conclusion.   
 
The two cases concerned can be schematized as follows: 
 
Case A: refuting a counter position 
My standpoint is X 
It may be argued not-X/Other people believe that not-X  [because of Z] 
But this is a mistake/They are mistaken [because Z is not true/relevant] 
 
Case B: conceding and subsequently dealing with a counterargument 
My standpoint is X, since Y is the case. 
One could put forward counterargument Z/ It is true that Z 
But Z is not relevant or has insufficient weight. 
 
In my dissertation Analysing Complex Argumentation (1992: 145-146), I have made a 
similar distinction between these two possible acknowledgments of objections. I 
regard case A as a way of introducing an opposing view in the confrontation stage of 
a discussion, and case B as a way of acknowledging a counterargument against one’s 
own argument in the argumentation stage of a discussion. In fact, in case A the only 
thing that is recognized or acknowledged is that other people might hold a different 
view, and not the counter position itself, since this is subsequently attacked. In that 
sense, labeling this type of prolepsis “recognizing strengths to the other side” might 
even be somewhat misleading. 
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My third and final comment pertains to the technique of framing. As Patrick Clauss 
points out in his conclusion, with prolepsis a language user is not simply anticipating 
and responding to a counterargument before it has been offered, but there are often 
several other important language acts taking place at the same time, one of which is 
the act of framing the issue for the audience. In order to get a better idea of what 
framing amounts to, I have analyzed the examples given of this technique. From this 
analysis it emerged that in the examples of framing specific types of refutational 
strategies are being used. In some of the examples the criticism is refuted by means of 
a dissociation. In others by means of a conciliatio.  
Let me first take a loser look at the cases where the arguer makes use of  a 
Perelmanian dissociation. According to the analysis of dissociation given by Agnès 
van Rees,  it can be seen as an argumentative technique 
 
that serves to resolve the contradictions that a notion that originally was 
covered by a single term, and up till then was considered as a unity, gives rise 
to. The speaker using a dissociation resolves these contradictions by 
distinguishing various aspects within that notion, some of which are subsumed 
under a new denominator. The now reduced old notion and the new notion that 
has been split off are not equally valued, one is considered more important or 
more essential than the other; therein lies the source of the argumentative 
potential of the technique (2003: 887). 
 
According to van Rees, the purpose of dissociation is to decide the discussion to the 
advantage of the speaker (2003: 887). This technique can be particularly helpful when 
a speaker is being accused of behaving inconsistently, which is explained by van Rees 
as follows:  “The contradictions that arose from the original concept are now resolved 
because a statement containing a proposition in which the reduced concept occurs can 
now be denied, while a statement containing a proposition in which the split off 
concept occurs can now be asserted […] without running into a contradiction”. (2003: 
887-888) 
 
Two examples from King’s Letter from a Birmingham Jail which are given by Clauss 
as examples of framing an issue seem to me to be dissociations. In response to the 
possible accusation of inconsistency that King advocates breaking some laws and 
obeying others, King dissociates between just and unjust laws, thereby refuting the 
accusation. And in a second example King makes a distinction between violent 
tension and constructive, non-violent tension in order to deal with the anticipated 
objection that his position as an advocate of non-violent action is inconsistent with his 
plea for the creation of tension.  
Clauss also cites an example by King in which the framing takes place by 
means of the technique of conciliatio. Conciliatio is a figure in which an arguer uses 
an argument of the opponent to support his own standpoint. This figure occurs in the 
example from King’s  text in which he attempts to parry the objection against his 
support for direct action that it would also be possible to negotiate. While his 
opponents see direct action as irreconcilable with negotiation, King  presents direct 
action by contrast as a way of achieving negotiation, thereby using the argument of 
the opponent that negotiation is a better path as a means to defend his own position 
that direct action is necessary.  
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3. CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, I think that the choice for a particular definition of prolepsis could have 
been better motivated and more attention could have been paid to the role the different 
characteristic features of prolepsis play in the persuasiveness of this figure. What is, 
for instance, the contribution of the anticipatory aspect of prolepsis to this 
persuasiveness and what the contribution of the refutation of the anticipated 
counterargument? Apart from this lack of clarity, I think that an alternative analysis of 
the distinction between the different types of prolepsis proposed by the author is to be 
preferred. And finally, by analysing some examples of framing the issue for the 
audience I hope to have made clear that it is possible to give a more refined analysis 
of the types of techniques that are used which are now all subsumed under the general 
heading of framing. Also, I have argued that it is not so much the case that the 
framing takes place concurrently with the responding to or refuting of 
counterarguments, but that the framing techniques themselves are a way of 
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